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PROCEDURE AND REHABILITATION UNDER
CHAPTER XII OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act,' which provides for real prop-
erty arrangements for persons other than corporations, has had a
torpid existence since it was enacted as part of the Chandler Act in
1938.2 Recently, however, Chapter XII and its provisions, particularly
section 461(11) which has been termed the "cram-down" provision, 3
have been the subject of renewed interest and controversy prompted
by a dramatic increase in the number of petitions filed under the
Chapter.' The principal factor contributing to the increase in filings
is a growing awareness that limited partnerships are eligible for pro-
tection under Chapter XII. Because of income tax advantages,'
11 U.S.C. §§ 801-926 (1970).
2 Chandler Act, ch. 575, §§ 1-7, 52 Stat. 883-938 (1938) (current version at 11
U.S.C. §§ 501-1086 (1970)).
See note 132 infra.
Between June, 1938 and March, 1974, only one petition under Chapter XII was
filed in the Northern District of Georgia. In the twenty months subsequent to March,
1974, thirty-five such petitions were filed. In re Pine Gate Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
1478, 1480 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977)
(No. 76-742). Approximately one third of all Chapter XII petitions ever filed were filed
in 1975 and 1976. Id.
A catalyst for the reawakened interest in Chapter XII was the publicity given the
filing under the Chapter by the $100 million Colony Square development project in
Atlanta, Georgia. Harvey, A Guide to Real Property Arrangements Under Chapter XII
of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 REAL EsT. L.J. 211 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Harvey]. See
Bus. WEEK, Nov. 3, 1975, at 70; Montgomery, Reopened Chapter: Real-Estate Slump
Helps to Revive Use of Long-Dormant Bankruptcy Provision, Wall St. J., Sept. 29,
1976, at 12, col. 1. See also Minard, Numbers Game: The Chapter 12 Cloud, FOaES,
April 15, 1977, at 74.
See note 4 supra, and text accompanying note 26 infra.
Investment in a limited partnership secures for the limited partner a tax shelter
for his income. The partnership is not subject to tax liability as an organization;
instead, the partners are liable in their individual capacities. I.R.C. § 701. Thus, a
limited partner is insulated from liability for partnership obligations in excess of his
investment, but his income from the partnership is not additionally taxed at the
organizational level as it would be had the partner invested in a corporation. 4 P.
ROHAN, REAL EsTATE TRANSACTIONS: REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 2.02 [1,21, at 2-4, 2-5-6
(1976). Consequently, a limited partner may deduct from personal income such items
as the share attributable to his contribution to the partnership of partnership losses
up to the amount of his contribution, of interest on loans to the partnership, and of
depreciation of completed real estate projects owned by the partnership. Watkins, The
Real Estate Debtor - I, in BANKRUPTcY: REORGANIZATION AND REHABILITATION 227, 229
(1972) (prepared for a Practicing Law Institute Seminar, Macey, Chairman)
[hereinafter cited as Watkins]. See I.R.C. §§ 702(a), 704(d). Formerly, the limited
partner could qualify for loss deductions in excess of his investment in the partnership
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within the past twenty years limited partnerships have become a
favorite vehicle for owning, capitalizing, and managing real estate
developments.' The recent economic recession has resulted in many
of these partnerships becoming either insolvent or, because of dimin-
ishing cash-flow,8 unable to pay their obligations as they accrue.,
Chapter XII provides a unique opportunity for insolvent individuals
and partnerships to adjust the terms of their obligations while operat-
ing their businesses and retaining possession and control of their
property.10
An "astounding paucity of authority"" on Chapter XII impedes
analysis of the Chapter and creates uncertainty concerning the scope
and ramifications of its provisions. 12 In contrast with other chapters
of the Bankruptcy Act, relatively few judicial decisions have been
recorded that deal with Chapter XII. 13 Furthermore, the Chapter's
meager legislative history provides little illumination of its intended
scope. 4 Consequently, Chapter XII is best understood through analy-
sis of its basic provisions in relation to analogous provisions of other
Bankruptcy Act chapters, particularly Chapters X15 and XI.L 8
because his proportionate share of partnership liabilities were added to his contribu-
tion to determine his basis in the partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). The
limited partner may no longer include in his basis any proportion of partnership obliga-
tions for which he is not personally liable. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 213(e), 90 Stat.
1547, amending I.R.C. § 704(d).
7 Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble: Lender's Remedies Need an Overhaul, 31 Bus.
LAW. 1927, 1962-63 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Lifton].
See, e.g., In re St. Simon's Properties, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1400, 1402 (N.D. Ga.
1976).
, Arnold, New Interest in Chapter XII Bankruptcy Proceedings, 5 REAL EsT. L.J.
66 (1976); Lifton, supra note 7, at 1961. See note 4 supra.
"1 The purpose of Chapter XII is to allow the debtor to rehabilitate himself by
extending the time for payment of his creditors and by adjusting the terms of his
obligations while remaining in possession of his property. Bass v. Dick, 296 F.2d 912,
914 (7th Cir. 1961).
" Charlestown Say. Bank v. Martin (In re Colonial Realty Inv. Co.) 516 F.2d 154,
157 n.2 (1st Cir. 1975).
12 See Bus. WEEK., Nov. 3, 1975, at 71.
1 Many of the reported opinions concerning Chapter XII offer little assistance in
analyzing procedures or in determining the permissible scope of relief under the Chap-
ter. For an extreme example, see Brown v. Hyer (In re Pawling), 415 F.2d 1212 (9th
Cir. 1969) (appeal of order dismissing Chapter XII petition dismissed because appel-
lees failed to appear in court for argument).
" See H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-53 (1937) (four pages of 77 page
report on Chandler Act devoted to discussion of Chapter XII).
" Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970).
" Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-399, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970).
CHAPTER XII
I. Who May File a Chapter XII Petition
Only a debtor may file a petition for an arrangement 7 under
Chapter XII.1 "Debtor"' 9 is defined as a person,2" other than a corpo-
ration,"' who may become a bankrupt under section 3 of the Act,
2
17 A Chapter XII arrangement is "any plan which has for its primary purpose the
alteration or modification of the rights of creditors. . . holding debts secured by real
property or a chattel real" legally or equitably owned by the debtor. Bankruptcy Act
§ 406(1), 11 U.S.C. § 806(1) (1970). Under Chapter XI an arrangement is a plan
providing for the settlement, satisfaction, or extension of time for payment of the
debtor's unsecured debts. Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970).
1" See Bankruptcy Act §§ 421, 422, 11 U.S.C. §§ 821, 822 (1970). Chapter XII
makes no provision for the filing of an involuntary petition against the debtor. 9 W.
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 4.01 (14th ed. 1976) (hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. Once the
petition is filed creditors may propose arrangements. Bankruptcy Act § 466, 11 U.S.C.
§ 866 (1970); Watkins, supra note 6, at 239. See text accompanying notes 90-91 infra.
"1 Bankruptcy Act § 406(6), 11 U.S.C. § 806(6) (1970).
2 "Persons" includes corporations, except where otherwise provided, public offi-
cers, partnerships, and women. Bankruptcy Act § 1(23), 11 U.S.C. § 1(23) (1970).
Provisions of Chapters I-VII, which include many definitions, apply in Chapter XII
proceedings insofar as those provisions do not conflict, or are not inconsistent with
specific provisions of Chapter XII. Bankruptcy Act § 402, 11 U.S.C. § 802 (1970).
Otherwise, the provisions of Chapter XII apply exclusively to proceedings thereunder.
Bankruptcy Act §§ 401, 402, 11 U.S.C. §§ 801, 802 (1970).
21 Bankruptcy Act § 1(8), 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1970) defines "corporation" as includ-
ing bodies having powers and privileges of private corporations not possessed by indi-
viduals or partnerships, partnership associations if the subscribed capital alone is
responsible for association debts, joint-stock companies, unincorporated businesses
and associations, and any business conducted by trustees when ownership or beneficial
interest is evidenced by written instrument. This definition is crucial because it in-
cludes a variety of companies and associations not normally considered corporations.
9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 2.07, at 763; Harvey, supra note 4, at 213. See 9 REMINGTON
ON BANKRUPTCY § 3699, at 378, 11-18 (6th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as REMINGTON).
See generally 1 COLLIER, supra, note 18, at % 1.08.
Although limited partnership interests may be considered securities, see Hrusoff,
Securities Aspects of Real Estate Partnerships, 11 CALIF. W.L. REv. 425, 425-29 (1975),
no provision is made in Chapter XII for intervention by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Hunt, The Proper Use of the Chapters X, XI, and XII of the
Bankruptcy Act, 13 REF. J. 97, 100 (1939). If limited partnership interests or obliga-
tions of the partnership are held by the investing public, the SEC might seek to
intervene in the Chapter XII proceedings through FED. R. Civ. P. 24, although it is
doubtful such an attempt would be successful. See Give the Debtor Relief, 15 REF. J.
22, 26-27 (1940). But see SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S.
434 (1940) (where statutory duties of SEC require intervention in Chapter XI proceed-
ings, SEC may intervene under FED. R. Civ. P. 24 to seek dismissal of Chapter XI
petition). Bankruptcy Act § 328, 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970), permitting the SEC to inter-
vene in Chapter XI proceedings to seek conversion to Chapter X proceedings, was
added to the Bankruptcy Act in 1952 in response to United States Realty. See H.R.
REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [19521 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
1977]
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who files a petition23 under Chapter XII, and who is the legal or
equitable owner of real property or chattel real" which stands as
security for any debt. The person's interest in the property subject
to the proposed arrangement, however, must be more than merely a
right of redemption from a sale before the petition was filed.2 A
NEws 1960, 1979. The reasoning of United States Realty might be applied to permit
intervention by the SEC in Chapter XII proceedings where real property of a corpora-
tion is transferred to private ownership for the sole purpose of filing a Chapter XII
petition. Cf. Sherman v. Collins, 75 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1934) (corporate entity not
ignored where sole proprietor of corporation transferred corporation's trust deed).
Under Chapter X corporate reorganizations, if the scheduled debt of the corpora-
tion exceeds $3,000,000, the plan for reorganization must be submitted to the SEC for
an opinion. Bankruptcy Act § 172, 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970). Upon the request of the
Bankruptcy court or upon court-approved motion by the SEC, the Commission may
intervene in Chapter X proceedings as a party in interest. Bankruptcy Act § 208, 11
U.S.C. § 608 (1970). The likelihood of such intervention usually depends upon the
amount of stock in the corporation held by public investors and the size and diversity
of public interests in the corporate reorganization. Macey, 10b-5 Actions Under the
Securities Act: Role of Securities Exchange Commission in Reorganizations, in
BANKRUPTCY: REORGANIZATION AND REHABILITATION 113, 118 (1972) (prepared for a Prac-
ticing Law Institute Seminar, Macey, Chairman).
22 The significance of § 3 of the Bankruptcy Act is that it culls certain persons who
cannot become bankrupt. A person other than a municipal, banking, or insurance
organization, or a building and loan association may become a voluntary bankrupt.
Bankruptcy Act § 3a, 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1970). Any natural person or corporation, with
certain exceptions, may become an involuntary bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act § 3b, 11
U.S.C. § 22(b) (1970). See generally 1 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 4.01-.21.
2 "Petition" is defined as a document filed in a court of bankruptcy or with the
clerk thereof which initiates bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy Act § 1(24), 11
U.S.C. § 1(24) (1970). The official form for an original petition under Chapter XII is
Form No. 12-F1. The official form for a Chapter XII petition in a pending bankruptcy
proceeding is Form No. 12-F2.
24 A chattel real is an interest in real estate that is less than a freehold interest. 9
COLLIER, supra note 18, 2.02, at 755. The estate for years is an example of such an
estate. T. BERGEN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS
42-43 (1966).
1 The limitation that a debtor must be legal or equitable owner of an interest in
real property correlates with the requirement under Bankruptcy Act § 406(1), 11
U.S.C. § 806(a) (1970), that a Chapter XII arrangement must have for its primary
purpose the arrangement of secured obligations. 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 2.07, at
763. The purpose of the provision excluding from the category of debtors anyone hold-
ing merely the right to redeem from a sale prior to filing of the petition is to restrict
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to property not actually sold as of the date of the
petition. Id. at 765. Equity of redemption after a sale is distinguished from an equity
of redemption prior to sale remaining in a mortgagor after execution of a mortgage deed
in a title theory jurisdiction. The latter transaction leaves equitable title remaining in
the mortgagor; this interest is sufficient to enable the mortgagor to become a debtor
CHAPTER XII
partnership may be a person and thus eligible to petition for an
arrangement under Chapter XI.28
under Chapter XII. Samoset Assoc. v. Trustees of Builders Inv. Corp., 2 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 1061, 1065 (D. Me. 1976). See Charlestown Say. Bank v. Martin (In re Colonial
Realty Inv. Co.) 516 F.2d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 1975).
Whether a person has an interest in property sufficient to invoke bankruptcy court
jurisdiction has been one of the more frequently litigated issues under Chapter XII. A
person whose property has been sold at a foreclosure sale prior to the filing date of his
petition, and who has no equity of redemption cannot qualify as a debtor under Chap-
ter XII. 9 REMINGTON, supra note 21, § 3699, at 378. See Tinkhoff v. Gold, 156 F.2d
405 (7th Cir. 1946). In other instances, whether a person may be a debtor is not readily
apparent.
A beneficiary under a so-called "Illinois" land trust is owner of a "fundamental"
interest in land sufficient to qualify him as a debtor under Chapter XII. In re Gordon
& Picard, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1269, 1273 (N.D. Ill. 1976). For general discussions of
"Illinois" land trusts, see Arntson, The Virginia Land Trust - An Overlooked Title
Holding Device for Investment, Business & Real Estate, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 73
(1973) ("Illinois" land trust as adopted by statute in Virginia); Turner, Some Legal
Aspects of Beneficial Interests Under II'inois Land Trusts, 39 ILL. L. Rav. 216 (1945).
Similarly, owners of fractional interests in a parcel of property that is part of a shop-
ping center, but whose interests are in the nature of an investment because they have
no right to partition the property, no right of possession, and no right to encumber,
lease, or improve the property, are nevertheless entitled to file a Chapter XII petition.
Owners of "SW 8" Real Estate v. McQuaid, 513 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1975). Where,
however, members of a partnership hold property not as partners, or in trust for the
partnership, but as individual trustees in common, the partnership may not file. Ellis
v. Yumen, 324 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 (D. Hawaii 1971). Neither may only one of two
tenants by the entireties petition under Chapter XII. In re Chalkley, 34 F. Supp. 969,
970 (E.D. Tenn. 1940). Whether the devisee of a life estate in encumbered property
may file under the Chapter is questionable. 9 REMINGTON, supra note 21, § 3699, at
378. See Iden v. New York Life Ins. Co., 107 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1939) (per curiam)
("assuming without deciding" that devisee of life estate may file Chapter XII petition).
The person filing need not be personally obligated on the debt that is secured by
the property. If he acquires property subject to a mortgage without assuming the
obligation, he may file a Chapter XII petition. Watkins, supra note 6, at 248.
28 See note 20 supra; In re St. Simon's Properties, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1400 (N.D.
Ga. 1976); In re Hartsdale Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). By includ-
ing partnerships in the definition of "persons" the Bankruptcy Act embraces the
"entity theory" of partnerships. Levy, Partnerships in Bankruptcy, 76 CoM. L.J. 289
(1971); Watkins, supra note 6, at 229-30. See Note, Bankruptcy: Partnerships:
Whether "Entity" or "Aggregate" Theory Should Prevail in Partnership Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 244 (1943). Confirming this notion is the statutory
provision that discharge of partnership liability alone does not discharge a general
partner's liability for partnership debts. Bankruptcy Act § 5(j), 11 U.S.C. § 23(j)
(1970). See Acme Tool, Inc. v. Flesher (In re Rogers-Fain Drilling Co.), 309 F.2d 636,
637 (10th Cir. 1962).
Generally, state law is applied to determine whether a partnership has those
characteristics which enable it to become a debtor under Chapter XII. 9 COLLIER, supra
note 18, 1 4.02, at 833. See In re Helmwood Apts., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1151, 1152 (N.D.
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In contrast, only corporations can qualify for reorganization under
Chapter X,2 and although under Chapter X12 persons and therefore
partnerships may petition and file plans for arrangements, only unse-
cured obligations can be adjusted under that Chapter." Thus, a pro-
ceeding under Chapter XII is the appropriate avenue for persons
other than corporations to seek adjustments in both their obligations
secured by real property and unsecured obligations."
Additionally, the Chapter XII petition must allege that the debtor
is either insolvent or unable to pay his obligations as they accrue.3
A person is deemed insolvent when the fair value of his real property
is less than the total amount of his debts.
3 2
Ga. 1976). Because a limited partnership generally must have at least one general
partner, the liability of all the partners is not limited to capital contributions, and the
partnership is thus not within the broad definition of "corporation." Samoset Assoc.
v. Trustees of Builders Inv. Corp., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1061, 1063 (D. Me. 1976). See
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(1); Harvey, supra note 5, at 213; note 20 supra.
If the mortgagee exculpates the general partner from liability through a clause in the
mortgage, the limited partnership may still petition under Chapter XII. In re Pine
Gate Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478, 1479, 1491-92 (N.D. Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977) (No. 76-742). A limited partnership may file a
petition even though one limited partner is a corporation owning a 97 per cent interest
in the partnership. Sayers v. Forsyth Building Corp., 417 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1969). See
In re PHB Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1620, 1621 (D.D.C. 1976). But cf., In re Hook,
Bankr. Dec. (CCH) 65,323 (D. Conn. 1974) (trustee may not file petition where
corporation is principal beneficiary of trust).
A Chapter XII petition filed on behalf of a partnership must be filed by all its
general partners. FED. BANKR. R. 12-8. See In re Chili Heights Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
134 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 4.02, at 833. This requirement is in
harmony with the provision that petitions under Chapter XII may only be voluntary.
In re PHB Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1620, 1621-22 (D.D.C. 1976).
Bankruptcy Act § 126, 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1970). A "debtor" is defined for the
purposes of Chapter X as a corporation by or against which a petition has been filed.
Bankruptcy Act § 106(5), 11 U.S.C. § 506(5) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act §§ 321, 322, 11 U.S.C. §§ 721, 722 (1970).
29 Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970). See note 17 supra.
30 In re Potts, 47 F. Supp. 990, 991 (E.D. Ky. 1942), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
142 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1944).
31 Bankruptcy Act § 423, 11 U.S.C. § 823 (1970). Inability to pay debts as they
accrue is the equitable definition of "insolvency." Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 303
(1945). The equitable test of insolvency is separate and distinct from that defined in
the Bankruptcy Act. Langham, Langston & Burnett v. Blanchard, 246 F.2d 529, 532
(5th Cir. 1957). For the statutory definition of "insolvency," see text accompanying
note 32 infra. The principal significance of the provision permitting an equitably
insolvent debtor to petition under Chapter XII is that the debtor may obtain relief
under the Chapter at a time prior to when his creditors might seek to force a sale of
the debtor's property in order to enforce their liens on the property. 9 COLLIER, supra
note 18, 4.06 [51, at 845-46.
12 Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970). See Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S.
CHAPTER XII
I. The Petition and Its Effects
A debtor may file an original petition under Chapter XII with any
court that would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition. 3 The
mere filing of the petition operates as an automatic stay of any pro-
ceeding to enforce a lien on the real property of the debtor.34 Conse-
300, 303 (1945); Hoppe v. Rittenhouse, 279 F.2d 3, 6 (9th Cir. 1960); Aqua Hotel Corp.
v. McLaughlin, 251 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1957). See generally 1 COLLIER, supra note
18, at 1.19; 1 REMINGTON, supra note 21, at § 65.
0 Bankruptcy Act § 422, 11 U.S.C. § 822 (1970). A petition may also be filed in a
pending bankruptcy proceeding prior to adjudication. See text accompanying notes 39-
43 infra. The court in which a Chapter XII petition is filed obtains exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the debtor and his property. Bankruptcy Act § 411, 11 U.S.C. § 811 (1970).
" In re Decker, 465 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1972); In re Bearden, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
1180, 1182 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Bankruptcy Act § 428, 11 U.S.C. § 828 (1970); FED. BANKR.
R. 12-43(a); 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 4.16, at 870; Harvey, supra note 4, at 216.
Section 428 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "[ulnless and until otherwise ordered
by the court, upon hearing and after notice . . ., the filing of the petition under this
chapter shall operate as a stay of any act or proceeding to enforce any lien upon the
real property or chattel real of a debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 828 (1970). The rules also provide
that the filing of a petition operates as an automatic stay. FED. BANKR. R. 12-43(a).
Prior to institution of the rules, § 428 of the Act was construed as providing that
the filing of the petition acted as an automatic stay on proceedings against the real
property of the debtor. Myer v. Rowan, 181 F.2d 715, 716 (10th Cir. 1950). See Bloomer
v. Southwest Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 36 Wash. 2d 752, 758-59, 220 P.2d 324, 327
(1950). The language of § 428 has also been construed as requiring that the stay be
issued only after a hearing, and that therefore, Rule 12-43(a) changes the statutory
requirements by providing that filing of the petition acts as an automatic stay. Klein
& Gerard, Chapter XII - A Midnight Reprieve from the Auctioneer's Block, 82 CASE &
Com., Jan-Feb. 1977, 24, 25; Shipley, Real Property Titles as Affected by Proceedings
Under the Federal Bankruptcy Acts, 75 CoM.L.J. 66, 73 (1970). The automatic stay
operative under § 428 is in the nature of a temporary restraining order. In re Decker,
465 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1972).
The Bankruptcy Rules were prescribed under 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970), which
grants the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules for practice and procedure
under the Bankruptcy Act, so long as the rules do not enlarge or modify any substan-
tive rights under the Act. The purpose of the statutory provision was to provide the
Court with the power to provide rules for bankruptcy procedure commensurate with
its power to provide rules for civil procedure. S. REP. No. 1561, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1964), reprinted in [19641 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3804. On April 28, 1975, the
Supreme Court ordered the Chapter XII rules take effect on August 1, 1975, and be
applicable to any pending and subsequent Chapter XII proceedings.
Where a mortgage grants a mortgagee a power of sale, the automatic stay effected
by filing of a Chapter XII petition prevents exercise of that power. Upon filing of the
petition all the debtor's property comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court. Bankruptcy Act § 411, 11 U.S.C. § 811 (1970). See text accompanying
not 35 infra. Exercise of a power of sale is inconsistent with the exclusive jurisdiction
of the court and thus is not permitted. Countryman, Real Estate Liens in Business
Rehabilitation Case, 50 Am. BANKR. L.J. 303, 305 (1976).
1977] 1003
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quently, the property comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
court when the petition is filed,35 and if the property is sold in enforce-
ment of a lien after filing of a petition, such sale is invalid." After
notice to the debtor and other parties in interest and a hearing, the
automatic stay may be dismissed in whole or in part. 7 Sufficient
In re Decker, 465 F.2d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 1972); Bankruptcy Act § 411, 11 U.S.C.
§ 811 (1970). See generally 9 COLLIEFI, supra note 18, at 3.01. If the state's statutory
scheme provides that during the period for redemption subsequent to a sheriff's sale
the title to the property remains vested in the mortgagor, the automatic stay prevents
title from vesting in the purchaser at the end of the redemption period. Cf. Hamblen
v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. (In re Thomas J. Grosso Inv. Co.), 457 F.2d 168, 171
(9th Cir. 1972) (automatic stay under Chapter X "protects" legal title of debtor).
When the petition is filed, the debtor's estate is usually entitled to receive rents
and payments from the property, with expenditure of such receipts limited to expenses
of administration. Charlestown Sav. Bank v. Martin (In re Colonial Inv. Co.) 516 F.2d
154, 160 (1st Cir. 1975). If, however, the morgage provides that immediately upon
default the mortgagee becomes entitled to receive such payments, subsequent filing
of a Chapter XII petition does not divest the mortgagee of his right to such receipts.
Great W. Life Assurance Co. v. Rothman (In re Ventura-Louise Properties), 490 F.2d
1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1974). Where a trustee, despite a clause in the mortgage granting
the mortgagee an immediate right to receipts upon default, collects and disburses
receipts from the property, the mortgagee is deemed to have held an equitable lien on
such proceeds and is entitled to an order directing reimbursement from the trustee of
proceeds received subsequent to the filing of a Chapter XII petition. In re Pittsburgh-
Duquesne Dev. Co., 482 F.2d 243, 244 (3d Cir. 1973). If under such a clause in the
mortgage an assignment of the right to receive rents and payments is not absolute, the
bankruptcy court obtains jurisdiction over those receipts. In re 1616 Reminic Ltd.
Partnership, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 563, 564 (E.D. Va. 1976).
11 Meyer v. Rowan, 181 F.2d 715, 716 (10th Cir. 1950). See Potts v. Potts, 142 F.2d
883, 888 (6th Cir. 1944).
31 Bankruptcy Act § 428, 11 U.S.C. § 828 (1970); FED. BANKR. R. 12-43(b). See note
34 supra. Although an automatic stay prevents creditors who have no intention of
accepting any proposed arrangement from recovering the value of their debts through
sale of the property securing the debts, the automatic stay provisions have withstood
constitutional attack. In re Pine Gate Assoc., Bankr. Dec. (CCH) 66,322 (N.D. Ga.
1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977) (No. 76-742). The automatic
stay merely delays recovery by the creditors of the value of their debts, and places the
onus on the creditors to seek dismissal of the stay. Countryman, Real Estate Liens in
Business Rehabilitation Cases, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303, 304-06 (1976).
During pendency of the Chapter XII proceedings the value of the debtor's property
may diminish resulting in loss to creditors if the petition is subsequently dismissed.
See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra. Thus, the hearing on whether the stay should
be dismissed, if such hearing is sought by creditors, should be held promptly so as to
comply with initial due process requirements that creditors not be deprived finally of
their interest in the debtor's property without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
First Nat'l Bank v. Robinson (In re B & B Properties, Ltd.), 423 F. Supp. 23, 25 (N.D.
Ga. 1976). See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974). An automatic stay,
however, should not be dismissed so far as it concerns proceedings to enforce liens on
CHAPTER XII
cause for dismissal of the stay with respect to particular proceedings
is indicated if the proceedings stayed are for collection of a nondis-
chargeable obligation. 8 Thus, a stay of proceedings to collect child
support payments in default should be dismissed if the proceedings
do not interfere with administration of the debtor's estate or affect
the real property that is the subject of the proposed Chapter XII
arrangement. 9
If a debtor is involved in pending bankruptcy proceedings he may
file a Chapter XII petition prior to his adjudication." Section 425 of
the Bankruptcy Act provides that the filing of a petition under these
circumstances does not operate as a stay of other bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, but invests the court with power to grant such a stay if
necessary for protection of the debtor's estate." The Federal Bank-
ruptcy Rules change the thrust of this provision,4 2 however, by auto-
real property unless there is a substantial likelihood that no plan for arrangement will
eventually be confirmed. Dismissal of the stay would permit creditors to foreclose on
the debtor's property, thus effectively ending the Chapter XII proceeding. See Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Pembroke Manor Apts., 547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1977).
Various other sections of Chapter XII provide for issuance of stays and injunctions.
See Bankruptcy Act § 507, 11 U.S.C. § 907 (1970) (court may enjoin prior foreclosure,
equitable or other proceedings in federal or state courts in which receiver or trustee of
debtor's property has been appointed). Section 414 of the Bankruptcy Act empowers
the court for cause shown to stay or enjoin suits against a debtor, or other proceedings
to enforce liens on a debtor's property. 11 U.S.C. § 814 (1970). See In re Kunz, 28 F.
Supp. 730 (D. Mont. 1939). In view of § 428 which provides that the filing of a Chapter
XII petition operates as an automatic stay of proceedings against the debtor's real
property, § 414 appears superfluous. In re Decker, 465 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1972).
The language of § 414 is broader than that of § 428, however, and permits the court to
enjoin any suit against the debtor, not merely suits to enforce a lien on the debtor's
real property. The bankruptcy rules supercede § 414 by providing that filing of the
Chapter XII petition stays any proceedings, whether or not to enforce a lien on prop-
erty, against a debtor. FED. BANKR. R. 12-43(a). See generally 9 COLLIER, supra note
18, at 3.06, 4.16.
Section 477 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 877 (1970), provides the bank-
ruptcy court with an additional power to issue injunctions. Upon confirmation of a
proposed plan for an arrangement, see text accompanying notes 119-125 and 127-130
infra, the court may enter such injunctions which are equitable and necessary to put
the plan into effect. Bankruptcy Act §477, 11 U.S.C. §877 (1970).
31 Debts exempt from discharge are enumerated in Bankruptcy Act § 17a, 11
U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970).
3, Hernandez v. Borgas, 343 F.2d 802, 806-07 (1st Cir. 1965).
,0 Bankruptcy Act § 421, 11 U.S.C. § 821 (1970).
' Bankruptcy Act § 425, 11 U.S.C. § 825 (1970). See Bankruptcy Act § 507, 11
U.S.C. § 907 (1970).
'2 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 4.13, at 864. See Advisory Committee's Note, FED.
BANKR. R. 12-7.
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matically staying the adjudication and administration of the debtor's
estate within the pending proceeding.43 Similarly, as where an origi-
nal petition is filed, the court may dismiss or modify the stay for
cause shown.44
Prior to enactment of the Chapter XII rules, the debtor's petition
was required to contain the provisions of his plan for arrangement.45
Under the rules, however, the plan may accompany the petition, or
be filed within a time as required by the court." The petition must
be accompanied by payment of fees, 7 a statement of the debtor's
executory contracts,48 schedules of all his debts, and a general state-
ment of his affairs." The debtor, however, need not comply with the
requirements for filing of statements and schedules if he includes
with his petition a list of his creditors, their addresses, and a sum-
mary statement of his assets and amounts owed. When such state-
ments are included, a plan will be accepted by the court if filed within
15 days of the filing date of the petition."0 Upon application, the court
may grant up to 30 additional days within which the petition can be
filed."1 The statutory provision for time extensions was added in 1952
to standardize filing procedures.2 The requirement that exten-
' FED. BANKR. R. 12-7.
Id. See generally 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 4.13.
, 11 U.S.C. § 823 (1970).
' FED. BANKR. R. 12-36(a). The requirement that a petition be accompanied by
debtor's plan for arrangement was formerly an occasional deterrent to filing of petitions
under Chapter XII. Lifton, supra note 7, at 1961 n.114. Debtors often petitioned under
Chapter XII because of the threat of foreclosure proceedings, with the result that the
debtor either did not have an opportunity to draft a plan, or filed hastily drafted and
unrealistic plans. See 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 4.06. Cf. S. REP. No. 2094, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3804, 3805
(discussion of reasons for amending similar § 323 of Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970)). The new rule liberalizes the requirement within which time
the plan must be filed. Lifton, supra note 7, at 1963. No provisions of Chapter XII
indicate, however, that a debtor is provided with an indefinite period of time for
rehabilitation. Therefore, if the debtor fails to file his plan within the time set by the
court, dismissal of the petition is appropriate. In re Matthewson, 406 F.2d 406, 407 (3d
Cir. 1969).
Bankruptcy Act § 424(2), 11 U.S.C. § 824(2) (1970). See FED. BANKR. R. 12-10.
"Executory contract" is defined as including unexpired leases of real property.
Bankruptcy Act § 406(4), 11 U.S.C. § 806(4) (1970). The definition is not restrictive,
but is broad enough to include all contracts pertaining to any subject matter so long
as future performance is required by the debtor. 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 2.05.
" Bankruptcy Act § 424(2), 11 U.S.C. § 824(2) (1970). See FED. BANKR. R. 12-
11(a).
I" The 15 day time extension is provided by FED. BANKR. R. 12-11(b).
5' Id.
, H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Seass. 18, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE
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sions be granted only for cause shown should, however, be strictly
enforced. 53
After the Chapter XII petition is filed the bankruptcy court has
power, upon notice to the contractual parties, to cancel any executory
contracts of the debtor." A contract is executory if any future per-
formance by the debtor is required. 5 If not, the contract is not execu-
tory and cannot be rejected. Any person injured by the rejection of
an executory contract is considered an unsecured creditor possessing
a claim in the amount by which he was injured."
The bankruptcy court also may authorize the lease or sale of the
debtor's property 7 so long as the lease or sale benefits the debtor's
estate or aids in achieving the objectives of the Chapter XII proceed-
ings." If, however, the court approves continuing the operation of the
debtor's business, any sale or lease of real property that is a normal
incident of the business need not be approved by the court."
During pendency of the Chapter XII proceedings the value of the
debtor's estate may diminish from its value on the date the petition
was filed.6" Correlated with this possibility is the further possibility
that the Chapter XII petition might be dismissed, prompting adjudi-
cation of the debtor as bankrupt and liquidation of his estate as in
ordinary bankruptcy proceedings." Consequently, to protect credi-
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1960, 1979. The statute provides for time extensions of up to ten
days before the debtor is required to file his statements and schedules. Bankruptcy Act
§ 424(1), 11 U.S.C. § 824(1) (1970).
-1 H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1960, 1979.
51 Bankruptcy Act § 413(1), 11 U.S.C. § 813(1) (1970); FED. BANK. R. 12-52. The
plan for arrangement proposed under Chapter XII also may provide for rejection of
executory contracts. Bankruptcy Act § 461(4), 11 U.S.C. § 861(4) (1970). See note 105
infra. See generally 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 3.03; 9 REMINGTON, supra note 21,
at § 3706.
- See note 48 supra.
58 Bankruptcy Act § 458, 11 U.S.C. § 858 (1970).
5 Bankruptcy Act § 413(2), 11 U.S.C. § 813(2) (1970).
9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 3.04, at 801.
5' Id. See text accompanying notes 71-75 infra.
" 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 1 4.14 [1], at 866.
' Id. See, e.g., Nanz Trustee, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 423 F.
Supp. 930 (E.D. Wisc. 1977). FED. BANKR. R. 12-41 (a,b) specifies the conditions under
which a Chapter XII proceeding may be converted to an ordinary bankruptcy proceed-
ing and the debtor adjudged a bankrupt. Conditions under which the proceeding may
be converted include, for example, failure of the debtor to comply with orders for
indemnification, and failure to secure confirmation of a plan for arrangement. See
Bankruptcy Act §§ 481, 482, 511, 11 U.S.C. §§ 881, 882, 911 (1970). When the debtor
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tors from diminution of the debtor's assets in the event he is eventu-
ally adjudicated a bankrupt, the court may order the debtor to post
bond indemnifying creditors against possible diminution of his es-
tate . 2 If the debtor fails to comply with such an order, the court either
may adjudicate the debtor a bankrupt or may dismiss the Chapter
XII proceedings. 3
III. Proceedings Subsequent to Filing of Petition
The primary reason cited for the infrequency of petitions filed
under Chapter XII prior to 1975 is that courts formerly, as a matter
of common practice, appointed trustees to administer debtors' prop-
erty. 4 Appointment of a trustee is disadvantageous to the debtor for
several reasons. First, the trustee is vested with the right to posses-
is adjudicated a bankrupt in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings his non-exempt estate
is liquidated and the proceeds are distributed to his creditors. See note 38 supra, and
text accompanying note 171 infra.
"2 Section 426 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that a court may require the debtor
to indemnify his creditors against loss subsequent to the filing of an original petition
filed under Chapter XII. 11 U.S.C. § 826 (1970). FED. B~AKR. R. 12-19(d) grants the
bankruptcy court power to require such indemnification, but does not restrict exercise
of that power to cases where an original petition is filed. The rule is intended to
broaden the scope of the statutory provision by permitting courts to require indemnifi-
cation where a Chapter XII petition is filed in a pending bankruptcy proceeding. See
Advisory Committee's Note, FED. BANKR. R. 12-19(d).
The court's power to require indemnification of creditors for losses during pen-
dency of the Chapter XII proceedings is discretionary. Indemnification should not be
required unless creditors demonstrate that the value of the debtor's estate is likely to
diminish, particularly if the debtor probably will be unable to obtain indemnification
bonds, because failure to provide such a bond, if required, would result in dismissal of
the Chapter XII petition. In re Pine Gate Assoc., Bankr. Dec. (CCH) 66,322 (N.D.
Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977) (No. 76-742). See text
accompanying note 61 infra.
Bankruptcy Act § 427, 11 U.S.C. § 827 (1970). See Crosby v. Mills, 413 F.2d
1273 (10th Cir. 1969).
" Lifton, supra note 7, at 1964 ("it was generally expected that the court would
exercise its discretion" to appoint a trustee). Bankruptcy Act § 432, 11 U.S.C. § 832
(1970) provides that "[tihe court may, upon the application of any party in interest,
appoint a trustee of the property of the debtor." Bankruptcy Act § 444, 11 U.S.C. §
844 (1970), provides that if no trustee is appointed the debtor "shall" retain possession
and control of his property. See Press v. Kirkpatrick & Burks, 115 F.2d 802 (6th Cir.
1940). FED. BANKR. R. 12-17(b), however, changes the focus of the permissive language
of § 444 of the Act, and creates a presumption that where an original petition is filed,
or where the Chapter XII petition is filed in a pending bankruptcy proceeding in which
no trustee has been appoined, the debtor shall remain in possession and control of his
property. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
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sion of all real property and chattels real of the debtor." Second, the
trustee is empowered to collect and disburse rents and payments
received from the property." Third, if operation of the debtor's busi-
ness is continued, the trustee assumes management and control."
Further, the trustee is entitled to receive compensation from the
debtor's estate for his services." Thus, where a trustee is appointed
in Chapter XII proceedings, the debtor loses his rights to possession
and control of his property, and incurs an additional obligation that
must be paid from his estate.
The new Chapter XII rules, however, eliminate this impediment
to the filing of petitions under Chapter XII by creating a presumption
that a debtor filing either an original petition, or a petition in a
pending bankruptcy proceeding in which no trustee has been ap-
pointed, shall remain in possession of his property." Although under
this rule the debtor initially may remain in possession, upon applica-
tion of a party in interest and for cause shown the court may appoint
a trustee. In contrast, if the Chapter XII petition is filed in a pend-
ing bankruptcy proceeding where a trustee has already been ap-
6 Bankruptcy Act § 441, 11 U.S.C. § 841 (1970) prescribes that a trustee ap-
pointed in Chapter XII proceedings becomes vested with the rights and title of a
trustee appointed in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings under Bankruptcy Act § 44a,
11 U.S.C. § 72(a) (1970). Under § 70a of the Act, which describes the rights and powers
of such a trustee, the trustee when appointed becomes vested with all the debtor's title
and rights to possession of his property. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970). See 9 COLLIER, supra
note 18, 1 6.01, at 963-64. See also 44 COLLIER, supra, at 1 70.04.
" See note 35 supra.
See Bankruptcy Act § 445, 11 U.S.C. § 845 (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 491(2), 11 U.S.C. § 891(2) (1970); FED. BANKR. R. 12-28(a).
See generally 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 11 11.01, 11.01A.
," In re Pine Gate Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478, 1480 (N.D. Ga. 1976), cert.
denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977) (No. 76-742). See Arnold, New Interest
in Chapter XII Bankruptcy Proceedings, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 66 (1976); Harvey, supra
note 4, at 217; Watkins, supra note 6 at 241. FED. BANKR. R. 12-17(b) states that
where no trustee in bankruptcy has previously qualified, the debtor shall remain in
possession of his property.
A debtor in possession retains all his title and rights to possession of his property
and, subject to the control of the court, may exercise all the rights of a trustee ap-
pointed under Chapter XII. Bankruptcy Act § 444, 11 U.S.C. § 844 (1970). See
generally 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 1 6.04.
11 FED. BANKR. R. 12-17(b). See Bankruptcy Act § 432, 11 U.S.C. § 832 (1970).
Circumstances that would indicate there is sufficient cause to appoint a trustee include
that the debtor has been out of possession for a significant period of time, that no plan
for arrangement has been filed, that, when filed, there exists little reasonable likeli-
hood the plan will be confirmed, and that there is a great likelihood that the property
value will deteriorate. Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Gillen, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 95, 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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pointed and has qualified,7' the same trustee automatically will be
appointed as trustee in the Chapter XII proceeding.
7 2
Express authorization must be obtained from the court before the
debtor in possession or trustee is permitted to continue operation of
the debtor's business." Although the power to grant such authoriza-
tion is discretionary, continuation of the debtor's business represents
the norm under Chapter XII proceedings. 74 The bankruptcy court
may, however, impose limitations on the conduct of the business, 5
one of the most frequently imposed of which is that the debtor or
trustee indemnify creditors against probable losses arising from fu-
ture business operations." The court's power to require such indemni-
fication is independent of its power to require indemnification of
creditors against possible diminution of the value of the debtor's
estate during pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. 7
Upon application of any parties in interest to the Chapter XII
proceedings the court is empowered to appoint one or more appraisers
to determine the value of the debtor's property.78 Appraisal is desira-
ble because it provides creditors with an independent valuation of the
property that can be considered in later deciding whether to accept
a proposed arrangement.79 Furthermore, appraisal aids the court in
determining at what price the debtor's property should be sold if a
sale is to be made either after the petition is filed,"8 or as a part of
the proposed Chapter XII arrangement.8
After the petition is filed the court must "promptly" call a meet-
ing of the debtor, his creditors, and other interested parties.82 The
meeting must be held within 20 to 40 days after the date the petition
71 Generally, to qualify as a trustee under Chapter XII a person must have no
interest adverse to the estate, be competent to perform his duties, and have a residence
or office in the state in which the proceedings are pending. FED. BANKR. R. 209(d). Rule
209(d) is made applicable to Chapter XII by FED. BANKR. R. 12-17(d). See generally 9
COLLIER, supra note 18, at 5.02.
72 FED. BANKR. R. 12-17(a).
71 Bankruptcy Act § 445, 11 U.S.C. § 845 (1970). The court may approve operation
of the business only upon terms and conditions that benefit the estate of the debtor.
FED. BANKR. R. 12-22.
Advisory Committee's Note, FED. BANKR. R. 12-22.
7 FED. BANKR. R. 12-22.
,' 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, T 6.05, at 974.
" Id. See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
Bankruptcy Act § 433, 11 U.S.C. § 833 (1970).
" 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 5.03, at 910.
See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 135-39 infra.
92 11 U.S.C. § 834 (1970).
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was filed. At the meeting the presiding judge must determine the
validity of creditors' claims, 4 may examine witnesses on any matters
pertinent to the proceedings,5 and must also receive and determine
the validity of creditors' written acceptances of a proposed Chapter
XII arrangement. The requirement that the judge receive accept-
ances indicates that acceptances, to be considered and counted, must
be filed with the court." The further responsibility of the court to
determine validity of acceptances involves a twofold inquiry by the
court. First, because only creditors affected by the plan are entitled
to accept or reject a plan for arrangement,8 the court must determine
which creditors are affected and how many of them have accepted.
A3FED. BANKIR. R. 12-24(a) (1).
a Bankruptcy Act § 436(2), 11 U.S.C. § 836(2) (1970). A "claim" is defined as
including any claim of any character against a debtor or his property. Bankruptcy Act
§ 406(2), 11 U.S.C. § 806(2) (1970).
The schedule filed by the debtor of his debts and affairs, see text accompanying
notes 47-52 supra, is received by the court as prima facie evidence of the validity and
amount of those claims if the schedules are uncontested. FED. BANKR. R. 12-30(a). If
allowance of a claim is objected to, the objection must be made in writing. If the
objection is coupled with a demand for relief the proceeding becomes an adversary
proceeding. FED. BANKR. R. 12-30(f). FAD. BANKR. R. 701-814 control adversary pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy.
Before he is able to accept or reject a plan for arrangement, the creditor's claim
must first be allowed pursuant to Rule 12-30. FED. BANKR. R. 12-37(a). See text accom-
panying notes 85-92 infra.
Bankruptcy Act § 436(3), 11 U.S.C. § 836(3) (1970).
Acceptance of a plan may be obtained before or after the Chapter XII petition
is filed. Bankruptcy Act § 436(4), 11 U.S.C. § 836(4) (1970). The section contemplates
that acceptances for a creditor's plan for arrangement may be obtained before or after
the Chapter XII petition is filed. 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 5.10. Under Chapter
XI acceptances may be obtained only by a debtor before or after a petition is filed.
Bankruptcy Act § 336(4), 11 U.S.C. § 7346(4) (1970).
8 Bankruptcy Act § 436(4), 11 U.S.C. § 836(4) (1970); 9 COLLIER, supra note 18,
5.10, at 920.
" Acceptance by all or some number of creditors affected by a plan is a requisite
for confirmation. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 467, 468, 11 U.S.C. §§ 867, 868 (1970). The
statute provides that a creditor is affected by a plan when his interest will be materially
and adversely affected by the plan. Bankruptcy Act § 407, 11 U.S.C. § 807 (1970).
Likewise, where the terms and provisions of the obligation owed will be altered, the
creditor is affected by the plan. Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1941).
Where, however, the value of the property dealt with by the plan is less than the
amount owed under a senior mortgage, subordinate lienors are not affected by a plan
which merely provides for the real property of the debtor. In re Hamburger, 117 F.2d
932, 935 (6th Cir. 1941).
" 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 5.10, at 920-21.
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This determination is crucial in deciding whether a proposed arrange-
ment should be confirmed." Second, because separate plans can be
proposed and subsequently modified by the debtor or creditors,9 the
court must determine which acceptances pertain to which plans if
more than one plan has been submitted.92
As part of the process of determining the validity of acceptances
the court may also direct division of the creditors into classes " if such
a division is proposed in a plan for arrangement.94 The division should
be made according to the legal nature of the creditor's claims and the
nature of the property standing as security for the claims, with claims
of the same character classified together." Thus, two lenders holding
first mortgages with identical terms but which cover different proper-
ties could be placed in different classes because their securities dif-
fer.9" Concordantly, a lender holding a first mortgage on a particular
property, and a second mortgage on the same property, could be
placed in a different class for each of his claims because the two
claims are of different legal character.
9 7
If no appraiser has been appointed the court may find it beneficial
for classification purposes to hold a hearing for determination of the
" Some requisite number of creditors must accept a plan before it can be con-
firmed. See text accompanying notes 127-30 infra.
91 Bankruptcy Act § 469, 11 U.S.C. § 869 (1970). An arrangement approved by
creditors holding 25 per cent of the debts of some class and 10 per cent of all debts
affected thereby may be proposed to the court. Bankruptcy Act § 466, 11 U.S.C. § 866
(1970).
32 9 COLLER, supra note 18, 5.10, at 921-22.
Bankruptcy Act § 452, 11 U.S.C. § 852 (1970).
', The court may divide creditors into classes for the purposes of the plan and its
acceptance. FED. BANKR. R. 12-31(a). Thus, the court may divide creditors into classes
only if the plan so provides. 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 7.02, at 1006.
11 Bankruptcy Act § 52, 11 U.S.C. § 852 (1970); FED. BANKR. R. 12-31(a). See
Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1941) (mortgage prior to or subordinate
to materialmen's liens should not be placed in same class with liens).
" 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 7.06, at 1006.
'7 See In re Nob Hill Apts., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1463 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Nob Hill
provides an excellent example of the division of creditors into classes. In Nob Hill the
partnership owned two properties, designated Phase I and Phase II. Creditors were
divided into six classes for purposes of securing acceptance of the plan and for provid-
ing for the creditors under the plan. The holder of a first mortgage on Phase 1H was
placed alone in class 2 with respect to that mortgage, and was also placed alone in class
3 with respect to his second mortgage covering both Phase I and Phase II. The holder
of the first mortgage on Phase I was placed alone in class 1. The unsecured creditors
were placed in three classes consisting of creditors whose claims arose prior to filing of
the Chapter XfI petition, creditors whose claims arose after the filing, and creditors
whose claims were to be paid in case under the plan. Id. at 1464.
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value of the debtor's property. 8 If the amount of a secured creditor's
claim exceeds the value of the property securing the claim, the credi-
tor becomes an unsecured creditor for the amount by which his claim
exceeds the value.9 Therefore, the creditor, to the extent of the ex-
cess, might be placed and provided for in a class alone or with other
unsecured creditors.
9 00
If a proposed arrangement is accepted,'0' the judge will appoint an
agent to receive and disburse any deposits required of the debtor, and
will fix the time period within which the deposits must be made. 3
Deposits include any consideration"0 4 that will be distributed to credi-
tors under the arrangement, and money necessary for payment of
costs, expenses of administration of the estate, and any compensation
allowed by the court.' 5 The court will also fix the times for filing of
an application for confirmation of the plan and for a hearing on
confirmation.0
IV. The Plan for Arrangement and Its Confirmation
Section 461 of the Bankruptcy Act' enumerates the various pro-
visions either permitted or required to be included in a proposed plan
for arrangement. Among the provisions that may be included in the
plan are those for treatment of unsecured creditors in one or more
classes,' for rejection of executory contracts not earlier rejected by
" Bankruptcy Act § 453, 11 U.S.C. § 853 (1970); FED. BANKR. R. 12-31(b).
" See Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1941); 9 COLLIER, supra note
18, 7.03, at 1008.
'® See 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 7.03, at 1007.
1", See text accompanying notes 119-23, and 127-30 infra.
,02 Bankruptcy Act § 437(1), 11 U.S.C. § 837(1) (1970). See generally 9 COLLIER,
supra note 18, 5.11, at 923.
", Bankruptcy Act § 437(1), 11 U.S.C. § 837(1) (1970).
,04 "Consideration" is defined as including secured or unsecured "evidences of
indebtedness," stock and certificates of beneficial interest in stock, and certificates of
beneficial interest in property. Bankruptcy Act § 406(3), 11 U.S.C. § 806(3) (1970).
I' Bankruptcy Act § 437(2), 11 U.S.C. § 837(2) (1970). The making of such a
deposit is required by the court as a condition precedent to confirmation of an arrange-
ment. Bankruptcy Act §§ 467, 468(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 867, 868(2) (1970). The required
deposit does not necessarily include all the consideration which is required by the plan
for arrangement. Rather, the deposit must include only that part of consideration that
will be distributed immediately upon confirmation of the plan. 9 COLLIER, supra note
18, T 5.12(3), at 928.
,06 Bankruptcy Act § 437(3), 11 U.S.C. § 837(3) (1970).
07 11 U.S.C. § 861 (1970). See Watkins, supra note 7, at 241-43.
'o' Bankruptcy Act § 461(3), 11 U.S.C. § 861(3) (1970). The purpose of the section
is to allow plans to provide for unsecured creditors equally or in classes, thus permit-
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the bankruptcy court,"0 9 and for continued operation of the debtor's
business."50 The proposed arrangement must include provisions ad-
justing the rights of creditors possessing debts secured by real prop-
erty or chattels real,"' enumerating the rights of all creditors affected
by the plan,"' prescribing payment of expenses incurred in adminis-
tering the debtor's estate, 13 denoting which debts will be fully paid
in cash,"' specifying which creditors will be unaffected by the plan
ting payment of small claims in full, and settlements with different creditors on differ-
ent terms. 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 8.04, at 1069. If an unsecured creditor is affected
by the plan, see note 87 supra, he must be provided for in the plan. See note 111 infra.
- Bankruptcy Act § 461(4), 11 U.S.C. § 861(4) (1970). See generally 9 COLLIER,
supra note 18, 8.05, at 1070.
,,0 Bankruptcy Act § 461(5), 11 U.S.C. § 861(5) (1970). Continuation of a debtor's
business under a plan for arrangement is distinct from continuation during pendency
of Chapter XII proceedings. See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra. Rather, § 461(5)
refers to continuation subsequent to confirmation of the plan. 9 COLLIER, supra note
18, IT 8.06, at 1072. Section 461(5) does not provide the only means through which a
debtor may continue operation of his business subsequent to confirmation of a plan.
Unless otherwise ordered, upon confirmation the debtor regains title to and unre-
stricted control over his property. See Bankruptcy Act § 474, 11 U.S.C. § 874 (1970);
9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 8.06, at 1072.
Several other provisions may also be included in a plan for an arrangement. The
arrangement may provide for additional debts incurred during pendency of the Chap-
ter XII proceedings. Bankruptcy Act § 461(6), 11 U.S.C. § 861(6) (1970). By providing
in the agreement for payment of such lenders, the debtor can encourage prospective
creditors to advance capital credit after the Chapter XII petition is filed. 9 COLLIER,
supra note 18, 8.07, at 1073. The arrangement may also deal with all or part of the
debtor's property. Bankruptcy Act § 461(7), 11 U.S.C. § 861(7) (1970). See generally 9
COLLIER, supra note 18, 8.06, at 1074. Additionally, the plan may contain any other
provisions that are not inconsistent with Chapter XII. Bankruptcy Act § 416(13), 11
U.S.C. § 861(13) (1970). This section merely permits inclusion of a wide variety of
provisions that may be tailored to fit the circumstances peculiar to each case. 9
COLLIER, supra note 18, 8.14, at 1083.
"I Bankruptcy Act § 461(1), 11 U.S.C. § 861(1) (1970). This requirement rein-
forces the concept that an arrangement must have for its primary purpose the adjust-
ment of the rights of secured creditors. See note 17 supra. The requirement is satisfied
if the property that is subject to the plan is owned subject to a mortgage securing an
obligation not assumed personally by the debtor. In re Hamburger, 117 F.2d 932, 936
(6th Cir. 1971).
112 Bankruptcy Act § 461(2), 11 U.S.C. § 861(2) (1970). See note 87 supra. If the
value of the property is insufficient to satisfy a first mortgage, junior lienors are not
affected by a plan dealing solely with the debtor's property, and thus need not be
protected by the plan. Darvilla Housing Corp. v. Accousti, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1093, 1094
(D. Conn. 1976).
,13 Bankruptcy Act § 461(8), 11 U.S.C. § 861(8) (1970). See generally 9 COLLIER,
supra note 18, 8.09, at 1075.
" Bankruptcy Act § 461(9), 11 U.S.C. § 861(9) (1970). See generally 9 COLLIER,
supra note 18, 8.10, at 1076.
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and which provisions might concern those creditors,"' establishing
adequate means of executing the plan,"' and assuring adequate pro-
tection of non-accepting creditors so that they will realize the value
of their debts secured by their real property subject to the arrange-
ment."'The requirement that an arrangement must modify or alter
the rights of secured creditors is the principal characteristic that
distinguishes a Chapter XII arrangement from one under Chapter XI.
A plan for arrangement under Chapter XI can modify or alter only
the rights of unsecured creditors."' The Chapter XII arrangement can
affect the rights of both secured and unsecured creditors, but must
have for its primary purpose adjustment of the rights of secured credi-
tors."9
If a proposed plan for arrangement is unanimously accepted by
the creditors, confirmation of the plan by the court depends upon
satisfaction of several prerequisites. First, the debtor must make any
deposits required by the court.' Second, the court must be convinced
that proposal and acceptance of the arrangement have been made in
good faith and were not induced through any activities forbidden by
the Bankruptcy Act.' Third, the court must determine that the
M Bankruptcy Act § 461(10), 11 U.S.C. § 861(10) (1970). See generally 9 COLLIER,
supra note 18, 8.11, at 1076.
M Bankruptcy Act § 461(12), 11 U.S.C. § 861(12) (1970). A plan proposed by a
life tenant does not contain adequate provisions for its execution if it merely contains
a bald promise to pay. Iden v. New York Life Ins. Co., 107 F.2d 695, 696 (4th Cir. 1939).
A plan may adequately provide for its execution if it contains provisions for refinancing
to pay off the remaining principal on debts. See In re Pine Gate Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 1478, 1479 (N.D. Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977)
(No. 74-742).
Several methods of providing adequate means for the execution of the plan are
suggested in Bankruptcy Act § 461(12), 11 U.S.C. § 861(12) (1970). These include
retention of possession of all or part of his property by the debtor; transfer of property
in trust to a corporation already organized or to be organized; sale of property free from
or subject to a lien, with the proceeds distributed to creditors having an interest
therein; satisfaction or modification of liens; extension and modification of the terms
of securities and secured obligations; and issuance of securities in exchange for money,
property, existing securities, cancellation of debts, or other appropriate purposes. See
generally 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 8.13, at 1081.
"I Bankruptcy Act § 461(11), 11 U.S.C. § 861(11) (1970). See text accompanying
notes 150-52 infra.
"' See Bankruptcy Act §§ 306(1), 356, 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(1), 756 (1970).
' See text accompanying note 17 supra.
'' Bankruptcy Act § 467, 11'U.S.C. § 867 (1970). See text accompanying note 104
supra.
"I Bankruptcy Act §§ 467, 472 (3), (4), 11 U.S.C. § 867, 872 (3), (4) (1970); FED.
BANKR. R. 12-38(d). Chapter XII does not require an initial hearing for determination
of whether the petition was filed in good faith as is required under Chapter X. See
Bankruptcy Act § 146, 11 U.S.C. § 546 (1970).
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requirements of Chapter XII have been met,'22 and that the plan is
in the best interests of the creditors and is feasible.'1 Finally, the
court must insure that all payments made or proposed by the debtor
are reasonable and have been disclosed to the court.' 4
When the arrangement is confirmed the plan and its provisions
become binding upon the debtor and all his affected and unaffected
creditors.'21 Confirmation operates as a discharge of all debts and
liabilities that are subjects of the arrangement, except to the extent
they are provided for in the arrangement.' 6
The primary controversy engendered by Chapter XII does not
concern confirmation of unanimously accepted arrangements, but
rather is provoked by the interrelation of sections 461(11), 468, and
472 of the Bankruptcy Act. These are the principal sections that
govern a court's decision whether to confirm an arrangement over the
objections of non-assenting creditors. The controversy is provoked by
an interpretation that the statutory language permits broad discre-
tion in confirming arrangements, empowering courts to confirm ar-
rangements over the objections of creditors in derogation of their
rights not to be deprived of property without due process of law.,,
Any such power is circumscribed, however, by judicial decisions that
prescribe the due process requirements for compensation of creditors
deprived of property in bankruptcy cases.' 28 Confirmation of a Chap-
'1 Bankruptcy Act § 472(1), 11 U.S.C. § 872(1) (1970).
123 Bankruptcy Act § 472(2), 11 U.S.C. § 872(2) (1970). See text accompanying
notes 153-60 infra.
'" Bankruptcy Act § 472(5), 11 U.S.C. § 872(5) (1970).
,2 Bankruptcy Act § 473(1), 11 U.S.C. § 873(1) (1970). The binding effect given
a confirmed plan means that the rights and liabilities provided for in the plan are fixed
and deemed adjudicated, thus insulating them from collateral attack. 9 COLLIER, supra
note 18, 9.08, at 1148. See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938) (lack of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over obligation cannot be contested in subsequent state
court proceeding for enforcement of discharged obligations; bankruptcy court determi-
nation of jurisdiction is res judicata for redetermination of jurisdictional issue).
,26 Bankruptcy Act § 476, 11 U.S.C. § 876 (1970). Discharge effectuates the release
of the debtor from all his debts that were provable in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Bankruptcy Act § 1(15), 11 U.S.C. § 1 (15) (1970). The basic provisions concerning
dischargeability are contained in the Bankruptcy Act §§ 14, 17, 11 U.S.C. §§ 32, 35
(1970). The basic provisions concerning provability of debts are contained in Bank-
ruptcy Act § 63, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
A debt is provided for under the plan if the plan grants consideration for the debt.
9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 9.13, at 1156. See generally id., at T 9.13; 9 REMINGTON,
supra note 21, at § 3737.
'" See text accompanying notes 145-51 infra.
'2 See Lifton, supra note 7, at 1966-69. The creditor's right to realize the value of
CHAPTER XII
ter XII arrangement would violate due process only when these re-
quirements are not met.
Section 468'2 indicates how many creditors must accept before an
arrangement not unanimously accepted by creditors can be con-
firmed. The section states that a plan may be confirmed if accepted
by "the creditors of each class holding two-thirds in amount of the
debts in such class. . . exclusive of creditors or of any class of them"
provided for under Section 461(11).10 The purpose of the provision is
to permit confirmation of a plan when creditors holding two-thirds
of the amount of debts in some but not all classes accept the arrange-
ment. 3' Although there may be instances where acceptances by very
few creditors are sufficient to support confirmation of a plan, a court
cannot confirm a plan that is unanimously opposed by creditors.'
Section 461(11),11 which is frequently referred to as the "cram-
down" provision,' designates the methods through which a plan may
his debt through sale of the property standing as collateral for the debt is a property
right. See text accompanying note 140 infra.
'' 11 U.S.C. § 868 (1970). Section 468 is similar to § 179 in Chapter X. Section
179 permits confirmation of a plan for reorganization that has not been unanimously
accepted if accepted by creditors holding two-thirds in amount of debts in each class,
exclusive of creditors and classes provided for in the plan for reorganization. See 11
U.S.C. § 579 (1970). The equivalent section under Chapter XI requires acceptances
by a mere majority of creditors in both number and amount, but makes no provision
for excluding from consideration non-assenting creditors provided for under the Chap-
ter XI plan. Bankruptcy Act § 362, 11 U.S.C. § 762 (1970). See generally 9 COLLIER,
supra note 18, 9.03, at 1117.
Bankruptcy Act § 468, 11 U.S.C. § 868 (1970).
'3 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, § 9.03 [2.5], at 1123. See Herweg v. Neuses, 119 F.2d
941, 943 (7th Cir. 1941) (obvious connotation of provision is that arrangement cannot
be blocked because one class of creditors opposes plan); In re Pine Gate Assoc., 2
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478 (N.D. Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25,
1977) (No. 76-742) (plan confirmed where one of five classes did not accept); In re Nob
Hill Apts., 2 Bankr. Ct, Dec. 1463 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (two of six classes did not accept;
plan not confirmed for other reasons).
"I Meyer v. Rowan, 195 F.2d 263, 266 (10th Cir. 1952); Herweg v. Neuses, 119 F.2d
941, 943 (7th Cir. 1941).
'3 11 U.S.C. § 861(11) (1970).
' The term "cram-down" is derived from the notion that under § 461(11) a court
may take an arrangement and force it upon non-assenting creditors. See In re Nob Hill
Apts., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1463, 1465 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Arnold, New Interest in Chapter
XII Bankruptcy Proceedings, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 66, 67 (1976); Harvey, supra note 4, at
219; Klein & Gerard, Chapter XII- A Midnight Reprieve From the Auctioneer's Block,
82 CASE & COM., Jan. - Feb. 1977, at 30.
Section 461 is virtually identical to § 216(7) in Chapter X. See Bankruptcy Act §
216(7), 11 U.S.C. § 616(7) (1970). See generally 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 8.12;
6A COLLIER, supra note 18, at 11 10.12-10.17.
1977]
1018 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
guarantee non-assenting creditors adequate protection for realizing
the value of their debts. The first method listed for protecting credi-
tors is by sale, transfer, or retention of the property by the debtor,
with the property remaining as security for the debt. 135 If this method
is selected as the sole means for protecting all creditors with debts
secured by real property, the arrangement must fail because it does
not have for its primary purpose alteration or modification of the
rights of secured creditors as Chapter XII requires.1 3 The second
method provides that the debtor may sell his real property for at least
a fair upset price' 3 and apply the proceeds from the sale to the debts
secured by that property. 38 -This method, however, is of doubtful
utility because the majority of Chapter XII debtors seek to retain
possession of their property.'31
The third and fourth methods designated by section 461(11) pro-
voke the most controversy. Under the third method adequate protec-
tion for realization of the value of the debts may be provided by
appraisal and cash payment of the value of the debts;"" under the
fourth method creditors may be protected by any other method which
equitably and fairly provides such protection.'4' Confirmation of a
plan utilizing either method for protection of a creditor denies the
creditor his mortgage right to recover the value of his debt through
sale under a mortgage of the property standing as collateral for the
debt.4 2 The focus of the controversy concerning Chapter XII is the
issue whether such denial violates creditors' rights under the fifth
amendment not to be deprived of property for a public purpose'
'5 Bankruptcy Act § 461(11)(a), 11 U.S.C. § 861(11)(a) (1970).
-' See 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 8.12; text accompanying note 17 supra.
"I' "Upset price" is a minimum price set by the bankruptcy court that must be
met or exceeded before the property may be sold. 6A COLLIER, supra note 18, 10.15,
at 479 n.2. To be fair, the upset price must be high enough to provide just compensa-
tion for creditors' claims; otherwise, creditors' due process rights would be violated.
See text accompanying notes 141-50 infra. Cf. 6A COLLIER, supra note 18, at 10.15,
at 480-81 (discussion of requisites for fair upset price under Chapter X).
' Bankruptcy Act § 461(11)(b), 11 U.S.C. § 861(11)(b) (1970). See 9 COLLIER,
supra note 18, 8.12, at 1078. Cf. 6A COLLIER, supra note 18, 10.15 (discussion of
similar provision in Chapter X).
"I' See, e.g., Charlestown Say. Bank v. Martin (In re Colonial Realty Inv. Co.),
516 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1975); In re St. Simon's Properties, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1400 (N.D.
Ga. 1976).
10 Bankruptcy Act § 461(11)(c), 11 U.S.C. § 861(11)(c) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 461(11)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 861(11)(d) (1970).
'2 See text accompanying notes 144-45 infra.
"3 The public purpose of Chapter XII is to permit rehabilitation of the debtor by
providing for modification and alteration of the terms of his obligations while permit-
CHAPTER XII
without due process of law and just compensation."'
A mortgage grants a mortgagee a variety of rights in the mortga-
gor's real property. In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 1
45
a 1935 bankruptcy case involving a mortgage on a farm, the Supreme
Court found that under Kentucky law a mortgagee's property rights
included the right to retain a lien on property until the debt it secures
is paid, to realize on the property at a judicial sale, to determine the
date of such sale, to protect his interest by bidding at the sale, and
to control the property during the period of default.'48 The Court




The question whether payment of an appraised value of the prop-
erty may constitute just compensation for denial of the mortgagee's
right to realize the value of his debt at a sale was considered in Wright
v. Union Central Life Insurance Co.'4 There, the Supreme Court
emphasized that secured creditors have no constitutional claim to
any protection beyond the "extent of the value of the property.' '4 9 If
the creditor receives assurance that the value of the property,
whether or not equal to the amount of his claim, will be applied in
payment of his claim, the creditor is adequately protected."' Because
valuation by sale is not inherently more accurate than valuation by
appraisal, provision for payment of an appraised value challengeable
by the creditor insures protection for the creditor's rights commensur-
ting him to retain ownership of his property. See Bass v. Dick, 296 F.2d 912, 914 (7th
Cir. 1961). The federal bankruptcy acts are generally construed as having a public
purpose. See Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S.
513, 530 (1936); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 581-82
(1935).
'14 Lifton, supra note 7, at 1968. See materials cited in note 4 supra. Cf. 6A
COLLER, supra note 18, at 10.16, 10.17 (discussion of similar provisions under
Chapter X).
I's 295 U.S. 555 (1935). Radford concerned former § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act,
which provided that if their mortgagees refused to consent to time extensions for
payment of debts, farmers could require a bankruptcy court to stay foreclosure pro-
ceedings for five years. Id. at 575-76. The section was held unconstitutional because
creditors received no compensation thereunder for deprivation of their right to realize
the value of their debts through sale of the collateral. Id. at 601-07.
'46 Id. at 594-95.
' See id. at 595.
' 311 U.S. 273 (1940). Wright involved amended § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 203 (1940), whereby the debtor could redeem his property at an appraised
value prior to a public sale of the property. Id. at 277.
,' Id. at 278.
' Id. at 278-80.
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ate with due process requirements. 5' Thus, payment of an appraised
value provides just compensation for the deprivation of the creditor's
rights.
Included under the fourth method prescribed by section 461(11)
concerning protection for non-assenting secured creditors are plans
that alter or modify the terms of debts held by such creditors. Apply-
ing the analysis derived from discussion of the appraisal provision,
an adjustment in the terms of a debt meets due process requirements
if the value of the debt is preserved. 15 2 The determination whether the
value of the debt is protected requires investigation into the character
of that debt. If the plan proposes substantial changes in the terms or
nature of the obligation, the value of the debt might not be pre-
served.'53 For example, if the plan would transform a construction
loan into a permanent loan maturing in twelve years and bearing an
interest rate significantly below the original contract rate and current
market rate, the plan might not preserve the value of the debt.' 4
Section 472(2) provides that a plan shall be confirmed if the court
5I See 311 U.S. at 278, 281; In re Witherbee Corp., 88 F.2d 251, 253'(2d Cir. 1937)
(appraisal is as accurate a method of determining value as judicial sale; main purpose
is to insure mortgagee receives benefit of value of his debt); 6A COLLIER, supra note
18, at 10.16. Cf. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 150-55 (1974)
(concerning protection of creditors under Regional Rail Reorganization Act; protection
adequate if compensation provided for value of debt). For an example of a plan under
Chapter XII being confirmed where it provided for appraisal of and payment for the
value of debts, see In re Pine Gate Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478, 1482 (N.D. Ga. 1976),
cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977) (No. 76-742). If the the value of
the property exceeds the total amount of claims, provisions for non-assenting creditors
must be fully compensatory. Rader v. Boyd, 267 F.2d 911, 913 (10th Cir. 1959).
If the creditor objects to the valuation of the property by an appraiser such objec-
tion may be raised at the hearing on confirmation. See FED. BAKR. R. 12-38(c),(d). If
the debtor objects to the decision of the bankruptcy court, the case may be appealed
to the district court. See generally FED. BANKR. R. 801-814.
"I See Meyer v. Rowan, 105 F.2d 263, 266 (10th Cir. 1952); In re Pine Gate Assoc.,
2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478 (N.D. Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25,
1977) (No. 76-742).
3 A plan proposing a substantially extended time for payment of debts may, in
effect, merely grant the debtor the opportunity to speculate with his creditors' money
and thus not preserve the value of the debts. In re Huntley Square Assoc., 2 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. 1417, 1418 (D. Md. 1976).
"I In re Nob Hill Apts., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1463, 1465-66 (N.D. Ga. 1976). But cf.
Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Harris (In re Cabana Club Apts., Inc.) 455 F.2d 841
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844 (1972) (involving similar provision under Chapter
X; plan converting construction loan to permanent loan confirmed; provision in con-
struction loan for conversion to permanent loan if debtor obtained refinancing; creditor
prevented refinancing).
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is satisfied that the plan is for the "best interests of creditors."'5
"Best interests of creditors" is a term of art requiring that secured
creditors receive more value under the plan than they would have if
the property had been immediately liquidated at the time the peti-
tion was filed."5 Formerly, section 472(3) contained an additional test
requiring that the court confirm a plan only if satisfied the plan was
"fair and equitable.""' 7 "Fair and equitable" is another term of art
requiring an inquiry distinctly different from that involved in deter-
mining whether a plan is in the best interests of creditors.
The "fair and equitable" test evolved in corporate reorganization
proceedings and was codified in.Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.5 ,
The test there essentially requires that all secured and unsecured
creditors are entitled in reorganization to priority to the full amounts
.of their debts in preference to stockholders of the corporation."9 For
stockholders to retain interest the reorganized corporation, the value
of the new corporation as a going concern must exceed the value
necessary to compensate fully the claims of every creditor of the
former corporation.' Applied under Chapter XII, the test would re-
quire that before a debtor may retain possession and ownership of his
property, value must remain in the property after all his secured
creditors are compensated for the loss of their rights to the full extent
of their claims.'' Because application of the "fair and equitable" test
tended to frustrate the intent of Chapter XII that the debtor be
allowed to retain his possessory interest in the property, the "fair and
equitable" test was eliminated from section 472.112
The practical effect of the deletion of the "fair'and equitable"
language from section 472 is that debtors are permitted to retain
ownership of real property under an arrangement even though the
amount of debts secured by the property exceeds the value of the
's Bankruptcy Act § 472(2), 11 U.S.C. § 872(2) (1970).
"' Harvey, supra note 4, at 220. See 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 9.07 [3], at 1138.
11 See generally 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 9.07 [4], at 1141; Lifton, supra note
7, at 1964-69.
"' Bakruptcy Act § 221(2), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1970). See 9 COLLIER, supra note
18, 1 9.07 [4], at 1141.
Is' 9 COLLIR, supra note 18, 9.07 [4], at 1142. See Marine Harbor Properties,
Inc. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). See
generally 6A COLLIER, supra note 18, at 11.06.
160 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, % 9.07 [4], at 1142. See generally Comment, The
Secured Creditor's Right to Full Liquidation Value in Corporate Reorganization, 42 U.
CHI. L. Rsv. 510 (1975).
"' 9 COLLIER, supra note 18, 9.07 [4], at 1143.
1!2 Id. See H.R. RFEP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1952).
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property."6 3 One court has correlated the fact of deletion with the fact
that, in contrast to Chapter X, no initial determination must be
made under Chapter X1I whether the petition was filed in good faith,
and has determined that the absence of such provisions indicates
courts should be more liberal in confirming plans for arrangements
under Chapter XII than they would be in approving plans for reorgan-
ization under Chapter X.111 Even if such license is indicated, however,
the courts should carefully scrutinize proposed plans for arrangement
to determine whether creditors receive just compensation for their
claims.'65
V. Advantages and Disadvantages of Chapter XII
Chapter XII offers several advantages to real estate debtors. Lim-
ited partnerships, which are popular vehicles for real estate invest-
ment, are eligible to petition under Chapter XII as entities apart from
their partners. This aspect is particularly attractive where the limited
partners are but investors taking no active part in operation of the
business.'66 Additionally, the partnership may file a petition if it is
,"3 Although the "fair and equitable" test was deleted from Chapter XII, the test
continues to influence decisions under the Chapter. In l1liance Standard Life Ins. Co.
v. Pembroke Manor Apts., 547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1977), the liquidation value of the
debtor's property was determined at a hearing under § 453 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 853 (1970), for the purpose of dividing creditors into classes. See text accom-
panying notes 76-79 supra. On appeal from the bankruptcy judge's order refusing to
lift the automatic stay on proceedings to enforce liens against real property, the district
court dismissed the stay on the grounds that because the outstanding debt was in
excess of the determined property value, the debtor had no equity in the property and
thus no arrangement could ultimately be confirmed. 547 F.2d at 807. The Fourth
Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that "going concern" value, not liquidation
value, should be considered in determining whether to dismiss an automatic stay. Id.
at 807-08. Deletion of the "fair and equitable" test, however, indicates that whether
the amount of debts secured by real property exceeds the value of the property is but
a factor to be considered in the decision on confirmation of a plan; a court should
neither automatically dismiss a stay nor refuse to confirm a plan merely because the
amount of debts secured by real property exceeds the value of that property. See 9
COLUER, supra note 18, 9.07 [4], at 1141.
"I In re Pine Gate Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478, 1482 (N.D. Ga. 1976), cert.
denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977) (No. 76-742). Although no initial finding
must be made whether a Chapter XII petition was filed in good faith, the court must
be satisfied that proposal and acceptance of a plan for arrangement were made in good
faith before the plan may be confirmed. Bankruptcy Act § 472(4), 11 U.S.C. § 872(4)
(1970).
"I See, e.g., In re Nob Hill Apts., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1463 (N.D. Ga. 1976); In re
Huntley Square Assoc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1417 (D. Md. 1976).
" Watkins, supra note 6, at 244. Chapter X is not available to partnerships, but
is restricted to corporations. See Bankruptcy Act § 126, 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1970).
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insolvent or unable to pay its debts as they accrue. Thus, if a partner-
ship suffers from diminishing cash-flow from its property and is un-
able to pay accruing obligations, it may avert sale of its property
under a mortgage by petitioning for an arrangement under Chapter
XII. ' Furthermore, the Chapter provides partnerships with the sole
means through which they can adjust both unsecured obligations and
obligations secured by real property. ' s The most attractive feature of
Chapter XII, however, is that it affords the debtor the opportunities
to retain ownership and control of his real property while circumvent-
ing foreclosure and sale by his mortgagees, and to free himself from
or to adjust the terms of his mortgages. Thus, the debtor is accorded
an opportunity to rehabilitate himself through better management of
his property and affairs without the burden of paying his mortgage
obligations on their original terms.
Chapter XII is also available to the individual owning real prop-
erty that stands as security for debts,"' and offers him a distinct
advantage unavailable under the straight bankruptcy provisions of
Chapter I - VII of the Bankruptcy Act.' 0 Under straight bankruptcy
the creditor's estate, including his real property, is liquidated and the
proceeds are distributed to the creditors before the bankrupt is dis-
charged from his obligations."' The bankrupt cannot retain owner-
ship of his property. Chapter XII, however, provides the individual
with the means through which he may be discharged from his obliga-
'7 Bankruptcy Act § 423, 11 U.S.C. § 823 (1970); Watkins, supra note 6, 244. See,
e.g., In re St. Simon's Properties, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1400 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
,MI n re Potts, 47 F. Supp. 990, 991 (E.D. Ky. 1942), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
142 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1944).
"' See Bankruptcy Act § 406(6), 11 U.S.C. § 806(6) (1970). An individual is
eligible to petition under Chapter XI, Bankruptcy Act §§ 306(3), 321, 322, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 706(3), 721, 722 (1970), but arrangements under Chapter XI can adjust only unse-
cured debts. Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970). Under Chapter XIII
a wage earner may adjust the terms of his unsecured and secured obligations, except
those secured by real property or chattels real. Bankruptcy Act § 606(1), 11 U.S.C. §
1006(1) (1970).
Chapter XII was devised to grant individuals the same rights as corporations
under Chapter X to seek rehabilitation through adjustments in their obligations se-
cured by real property. Although not expressly stated in any of the congressional
reports, concern for individual homeowners was a primary motivating force behind
enactment of Chapter XII. Cohen, Chapter XII-Real Property Arrangements, 14 REF.
J. 28 (Oct. 1939).
,70 Bankruptcy Act §§ 1-70, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-110 (1970).
'" Bankruptcy Act § 2a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(7) (1970). The trustee in straight
bankruptcy proceedings is charged with the duty of collecting and reducing to money
the assets of the bankrupt, and distributing the money to creditors. Bankruptcy Act §
47d(1), 11 U.S.C. § 75(a)(1) (1970). See generally NAnLER, THE LAw OF BANKRuPTcY §
359a.8 (2d ed. 1972).
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tions, but retain ownership of his real property.
There are two principal disadvantages, however, for persons eligi-
ble to petition under Chapter XII. First, although a Chapter XII
arrangement may adjust the terms of debts secured by real property
or chattels real and unsecured debts, no provision is made in Chapter
XII for dealing with debts secured other than by real property.7 '
Second, the minimum number of acceptances necessary before a plan
not unanimously accepted'can be confirmed is unclear.' Thus, con-
firmation of a plan on the basis of a small number of acceptances
might engender litigation on the issue whether a requisite number of
acceptances were obtained.
The most controversial issue under Chapter XII concerns the
power of a bankruptcy court to force upon non-assenting creditors an
arrangement that adjusts their rights in the debtor's property.' The
controversy has arisen because, in comparison with other chapters of
the Bankruptcy Act, Chapter XII is virtually untested. An under-
standing, however, of the extent of the court's power to confirm such
a plan can be derived from analysis of the few sources of authority
on Chapter XII in comparison with authority on analogous provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act. These sources indicate that the power of the
court to confirm a plan is not so broad as it first appears, but is
circumscribed by fundamental if rather indefinite limitations, since
no plan may be confirmed if it does not protect creditors to the full
extent of the value of their debts."7 Any plan protecting the value of
the debts protects the creditor to the full extent of his property rights.
Courts, however, should be prepared to engage in a two-pronged
analysis to determine whether proposed Chapter XII arrangements
actually provide adequate protection, because a number of policy
issues are ultimately involved. Interrelated with the rehabilitative
purposes of the chapter and the interests of financially troubled part-
nerships and individuals owning real property are the interests of
creditors. If courts become too lenient in approving Chapter XI ar-
rangements, increasing amounts of capital that initially would be
recoverable through foreclosure might become embalmed in real es-
tate investments under arrangements having little chance for suc-
cess. Concomitant with this increased risk for lenders, interest rates
"I Watkins, supra note 6, at 252.
113 See text accompanying notes 127-130 supra.
17, See text accompanying notes 138-149 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 146-149 supra.
'7 See Draper, Stays of Mortgage Foreclosure-A Proposal for Reform, 93 BANKING
L.J. 133, 136-38 (1976).
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on loans for real estate investment may increase, resulting in de-
pressed real estate investment markets. Such a situation would bene-
fit neither lenders nor investors.'77 Consequently, in determining
whether to confirm proposed arrangements, courts should consider
not only whether just compensation is provided by the plan, but also
whether the debtor enjoys a genuine probability of rehabilitation
under the plan. Only if such a probability exists will confirmation of
an arrangement result in realization of the broad rehabilitative pur-
poses of Chapter XII.
BENJAMIN G. PHmPorr
'7 Id. See Minard, Numbers Game: The Chapter 12 Cloud, FoRBEs, April 15,
1977, at 74, 76.

